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I. INTRODUCTION 
For many people, the United States symbolizes justice, freedom and prosperity. 
Many foreigners are anxious to live in this "land of dreams fulfilled."l Immigration 
quotas, however, limit the number of persons who may attain resident status. Indeed, 
those that attempt to immigrate may be forced to wait great periods of time and suffer 
financial, emotional and physical hardship in their quest for resident status. There are 
some, however, who are fortunate enough to bypass these hardships. One group exempt 
from the numerical limitations are known as special immigrants.2 Under the special 
immigrant exception certain alien ministers and religious immigrants may enter the 
United States with little difficulty.3 Recently, the American public has experienced a 
heightened awareness and animosity toward immigration policy and governmental in-
volvement in religious matters.' This situation may foment a first amendment challenge 
to section 1153 which grants preferred status to certain religious immigrants.s 
I H. D. DEUTSCH, GETTING INTO AMERICA-THE UNITED STATES VISA AND IMMIGRATION HAND-
BOOK, XV (1984). 
2 The term "special immigrant" is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(2)(27). 
3 See 8 U.s.C. § 1151(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(i); 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(14). Under these 
sections of the Act, the term "special immigrants" includes "an immigrant ... who seeks to enter 
the United States solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of a religious 
denomination, and whose services are needed by such religious denomination having a bona fide 
organization in the United States." Thus, designated religious ministers, are exempt from the 
general numerical restrictions and labor certification requirements. 
The variance in the immigrant experience is largely due to U.S. immigration policy which has 
been characterized as involving both qualitative and quantitative restrictions. F. A VERBACH & E. 
HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (3d ed. 1975). If an alien falls within one of 
several preferential categories, they are assigned a number. This number corresponds with a certain 
entry date and is also subject to several other numerical criteria. For a list of the preferences see 8 
U.s.C.llOl. 
4 See Golden, Refugee Sanctuary: Churches Break The Law, 12 IMMIGRATION NEWSLETTER 5 (1986). 
5 The religious immigrant exception might be subject to an Establishment Clause attack. Gold-
stein, The Religious Path to Permanent Residence, 10 IMMIGRATION L.J. 17 (1982). 
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Generally, the Establishment Clause6 of the first amendment mandates that the 
government may neither establish a religion nor pass a law which "respects or leads in 
some way to establishment of a state religion."7 The language of the amendment itself 
is "tantalizingly brief" and quite vague.s Accordingly, many different interpretations and 
applications have evolved. The Supreme Court has generally applied a three-pronged 
test known as the Lemon test to scrutinize a challenged federal enactment.9 Recently, 
however, the Court has applied several other tests. to 
Although it is unlikely that section 1153 would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny 
under the tests commonly used by the Court today, it should not be considered uncon-
stitutional. The existing tests are based on the false notion that the framers of the 
Constitution sought absolute separation of Church and State. Historical evidence indi-
cates that the type of evil that the framers sought to prevent by means of the Establish-
ment Clause would not be created by the special immigrant exception for religious 
ministers. 
This note will first apply the Lemon test and the more recent Supreme Court analysis 
to the religious immigrant exception in section 1153. Critical examination of each test 
will reveal a more acceptable analysis in light of relevant historical evidence. 
II. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of statutes under the Establishment 
Clause has been inconsistent. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he uninitiated 
observer who seeks to make sense out of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause 
cases is in for a shock."ll Nonetheless, in the majority of Establishment Clause decisions, 
the Court has applied the Lemon test. 
A. Evolution of the Lemon Test 
The Supreme Court first confronted an Establishment Clause challenge in Everson 
v. Board of Education. 12 The Everson Court declared that the first amendment erected a 
wall of separation between church and state. 13 The Court emphasized that the State is 
not only prohibited from favoring one religion over another, but also from favoring 
religion over non-religion. Many commentators argue that this interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause which requires a strict separation between church and state was 
incorrect and explains the Court's improper position today.14 
6 U.S. CaNST. amend. I. 
7 Simpson, The First Amendment and Religion, II CORNELL L.R. 2 (1985). 
BId. 
g Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
10 See infra note 75. 
II HOWARD, Up AGAINST THE WALL: THE UNEASY SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, IN 
CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5,21 (J. Hersel ed. 1981). The reasons for this become apparent as 
the criticisms of each test are presented. 
12 330 U.S. I (1947). This case involved the State reimbursing bus fare paid by parents of 
children attending parochial schools. 
13Id. at 16. 
14 See, e.g., Graham, A Restatement of the Intended Meaning of the Establishment Clause in Relation to 
Religion and Education, 1981 B.YU. L. REV. 333; Smith, Getting off on the Wrong Foot and Back on 
Again: A Re-examination of the History of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the 
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In Engle v. Vitale,lS the Court further stressed the importance of complete religious 
neutrality by finding a school directive that required daily recitation of a prayer uncon-
stitutional. The fact that the prayer was non-denominational was not persuasive to the 
Court. This case further evidenced the Court's rigid view that the Establishment Clause 
mandated total separation. 16 Shortly thereafter, in Abington School District v. Schempp,I7 
the Court held that recitation of the Lord's Prayer within the classroom violated the 
Establishment Clause. The Court's examination of the purpose and the primary effect 
of the challenged enactment formed the first two prongs of the Lemon test. IS Finally, in 
Walz v. Tax Commissionl9, a case challenging a religious tax exemption, the Supreme Court 
added a third prong to the Lemon test. The Court in Walz stated that the law in question 
must not produce excessive entanglement between government and religion.20 Lemon v. 
Kurtzman combined the Establishment Clause analysis in these past decisions to create 
the three-pronged test generally used by the Court today.21 
B. Analysis of the Religious Immigrant Exception Using the Lemon Test 
In Lemon, the Court stated that the statute in question must "first have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally [it] must not foster excessive government entan-
glement with religion."22 Applying the Lemon test to the special immigrant exception 
indicates that the exception is likely to be determined unconstitutional. 
1. The Purpose Prong 
A majority of the controversial court decisions involving Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to legislative enactments have occurred where there was an initial finding that 
the challenged statute did not have a secular legislative purpose.23 To determine whether 
a statute has a secular legislative purpose, the Court first examines the enactment's 
legislative history. However, there are several factors which if present may prevent the 
Court from analyzing the legislative history. 
In determining the intent or purpose of a federal statute, the "starting point must 
be the language employed by Congress."24 The language of the religious immigrant 
Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOR. L. REV. 569, 572 (1984); See infra note 90 and 
accompanying discussion. 
15 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
16Id. at 429-435. In addition, the Court expressed its concern with the public's reaction to 
government placing its stamp of approval on religious beliefs. See also infra note 50. 
17 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
18Id. at 222. 
19 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (Establishment clause challenge to religious tax exemption). 
2°Id. at 674. 
21 403 U.S. at 612-613. 
22Id. 
23 One commentator referred to the purpose prong as the "sine qua non" of the Lemon test. 
Pevar, Public Schools Must Stop Having Christmas Assemblies, 24 ST. LOUIS U.L.]. 327,340 (1980). See 
also Note, Student First Amendment Rights in the Public Setting: A Topic of Increased Litigation, 6 A.J.T.A. 
163,169 (1982). For a recent Establishment Clause decision based on the purpose prong see Wallace 
v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). 
24 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). See also St. Petersburg Bank and Trust 
v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982). 
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exception is unambiguous as to its purpose.25 The drafters used such words as "religious" 
and "minister" freely throughout the statute.26 These words are also used frequently in 
the accompanying regulations.27 This overt use of religious terminology within a statute 
has proven fatal in similar Establishment Clause challenges,28 and could prove fatal to 
the religious immigrant exception. 
In addition, statutory construction through the "plain meaning" rule may evidence 
an impermissible religious purpose behind the religious immigrant exception.29 The 
"plain meaning rule" may completely prevent a court from analyzing the actual legislative 
history,30 because when the statutory meaning is clear, no further judicial interpretation 
is required.3l The religious immigrant exception is seemingly unambiguous as to its 
purpose and thus, might fall prey to the plain meaning rule. Furthermore, the fact that 
the provision requires the ministers' services to be "needed" by a religious organization 
in the United States might indicate a redeeming secular purpose.32 Proponents of the 
provision might argue that it is intended to remedy a religious labor shortage in the 
United States. However, a provision already exists that enables entrance of immigrants 
who will remedy a labor shortage.33 Because such religious immigrants are exempt under 
an existing labor preference, it follows that the special immigrant exception is merely 
superfluous and exists only as an aid to religion. 
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, even where the Court finds that the statutory 
purpose and language are plain and unambiguous, the Court has considered the statute's 
legislative history to interpret the statute's language. As one commentator stated, "[ilt is 
still possible to dispute whether the legislature really meant what it so clearly expressed."34 
25 The definition of the term "minister" evidences a religious purpose. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C) 
defines "minister of religion" as 
an immigrant who continuously for at least two years immediately preceding the time 
of his application for admission to the United States has been, and who seeks to enter 
the United States solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of minister of 
religious denomination, and whose services are needed by such religious denomination 
having a bona fide organization in the United States. 
26Id. 
27 For example, 22 C.F.R. 42.25 states: 
... a person duly authorized by a recognized religious denomination having a bona 
fide organization in the United States to conduct religious worship, and to perform 
other duties usually performed by a regularly ordained pastor or clergyman of such 
denomination. The term shall not include a lay preacher not authorized to perform 
the duties usually performed by a regularly ordained pastor or clergyman of the 
denomination of which he is a member, and shall not include a nun, lay brother or 
cantor. 
28 Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange City, 577 F.2d 311, 312 (5th Cir. 1978), 
ccrt. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979). 
29 See generally, Rhodes & Ceereiter, The Search for Intent: Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida-
An Update, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 485, 486 (1985). 
30Id. See also MCCAFFREY infra note 44, at § l(a). 
31 In the 9th Circuit, however, some courts suggest that it is mandatory to investigate legislative 
history when undertaking a statutory analysis regardless of the statutory language. Pettis ex rel. 
United States v. Morrison-Knudsen, 577 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1978) ("It is always possible that 
Congress did not quite mean what it said and did not quite say what it meant."). 
32 8 U.S.C. § llOI(a)(27)(C)(i). 
33 Id. 
34 Rhodes & Ceereiter, supra note 29, at 487. Recently, the Supreme Court, quoting Justice 
Frankfurter further stated that "the notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning 
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Thus, even though the religious immigrant exception has a dear religious focus, the 
Court might investigate the legislative history of the exception. 
An analysis of the legislative history surrounding the religious immigrant exception 
of the 1922 Federal Immigration Act is not particularly relevant or useful because most 
commentators consider the 1952 amendment to the Act as the first definitive immigration 
law in the United States.55 The legislative history of the 1952 amendment to the Federal 
Immigration Act is replete with references to religious purpose and motivation.36 As is 
the case with many federal statutes, the 1952 amendment is the culmination of a study 
by the United States government.37 In 1947, the Senate authorized a study of the 
immigration and naturalization systems of the United States.38 This two-year study, also 
known as the McCarran report, ended in 1950 and produced a 925-page document.59 
The recommendations of such a study group are generally considered to be reliable 
evidence of legislative intent.4o Within the McCarran report, there are numerous refer-
ences supporting an accommodation of religion. Over five pages are dedicated to an 
explanation of the benefits the U.S. has received by providing a haven for religious 
fugitivesY In a section entitled "Religion as a Factor in Immigration," the report openly 
refers to the important role religion plays in shaping American culture.42 Thus, the 
McCarran report provides evidence that the 1952 amendment was at least partially 
motivated by a desire to promote religion in generai.43 
is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification." FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 
(1982) (quoting United States v. Molina, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting». 
55 First, there is very little legislative history available regarding this provision. Second, in the 
1922 Act, it was combined with the now abolished exception for professors .. For an excellent 
discussion of the immigration laws and policies up to 1965, see AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 4-17 (2d ed. 1961). See also infra note 41 and accompanying discussion; Note, 
The Impact of Third Preference Status Professionals on Immigrants as Created by the 1965 Amendment to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act-Retraction of Expansion of Degree Equivalency, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo 
L. 311, 314 (1986) (Most scholars consider the 1952 amendment to be the first definitive immigration 
law in the U.S.). See generally HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: 
1798-1965 (1981). 
36 See infra note 42 and accompanying discussion. 
37 AUERBACH & HARPER, supra note 3, at 22. 
38 S. Rep. No. 137, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). 
39 S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). The study was conducted by U.S. Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary under Senator McCarran of Nebraska and was titled, "The Immigration 
and Nationality Systems of the U.S." For a complete examination of this report see TRELLES & 
BAILEY, infra note 41. 
40 See, e.g., Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 HOF. L. REv. 
1125, 1130 (1983). Professor Dickerson suggests that recommendations of a study group may be 
the most reliable evidence of Legislative intent. The report is less likely to be altered after the fact 
than other types of Legislative records. See also H. LINDE & G. BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESSES 385 (1976). The McCarran report is even stronger evidence of Legislative intent 
because Senator McCarran was also the sponsor of the bill. 
41 TRELLES & BAILEY, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACTS LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RE-
LATED DOCUMENTS 229 (1979). 
42Id. at 230. It is ironic that the report considered the very same factors that the original 
framers of the Constitution considered. 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 451 (J. Gales ed. 1789). 
43 The fact that Senator McCarran was also the sponsor of a bill might also support a finding 
of religious purpose. In Wallace, 105 S.Ct. at 2490, the statements of a sponsor of a bill were 
considered indicative of its religious purpose. If statements in this report are attributed to Senator 
McCarran, this may be strong evidence of religious motivation. This argument however, is quite 
tenuous and the Court may require further evidence. 
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In addition to documents generated in the legislative process, courts also examine 
the Act's historical context as an indicator of legislative intent.44 The early 1950's were 
characterized by many occasions of "official godliness."45 Although historical events may 
be far removed from the legislative halls, they are evidence that religious sentiment 
prevailed during the period in which the religious immigrant exception was enacted. 
Examination of the relevant indicators of legislative intent reinforces the theory that 
the legislative purpose was to promote religion. Thus, the religious immigrant exception 
probably would fail the secular purpose element of the Lemon test. However, it is im-
portant to recognize the futility in attempting to determine the "actual" intent of any 
legislative body. The nature of the legislative process promotes contribution by people 
with many different motivations.46 Many jurists and scholars agree that "[i]t is difficult 
or impossible for any court to determine the sole or dominant motivation behind the 
choices of a group of legislators."47 Even when a federal enactment directly aids a 
particular religious sect, the government may have secular motives.4s Legislators, being 
elected officials, have the "ballot box" motivating them to accommodate both religious 
and secular groups. A government may act because of various motivations, thus, the 
legislature may be incapable of acting with a single intent. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is unclear about what portion of the legislative 
purpose is permitted to be religious.49 The purpose prong has almost been reduced to 
mere rhetoric because the Court can attribute a secular or religious purpose to any 
legislation of which they approve or disapprove.5o This permits the Justices to disguise 
44 E.g., F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 33 (1953) ("Contemporaneous events may 
constitute an important extraneous aid to the construction of a statute."). 
45 BLANSHARD, GOD AND MAN IN WASHINGTON 21 (2d ed. 1960) For example, the new capital 
prayer room was established during this period. Id. In addition, during this era, the Presidential 
inauguration parade permitted a float entitled "God's Float" to begin the procession. Id. The float 
contained the motto "in God we trust" and "Freedom of Worship." It was essentially non-denomi-
national but undeniably religious. 
46 Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1969). 
47 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1970). 
4. See generally, johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. 
L. REV. 817,827 (1984). (For example, an atheistic ruler might well create an established church 
because he thinks it is a useful way of raising money or of ensuring that the clergy do not preach 
seditious doctrine). 
49 May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.C.N.J. 1983) (bona fide purpose); Beck v. McElrath, 
548 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (solely religious purpose); Lubbock Civil Liberties 
Union v. Lubbock Independent School District, 669 F.2d 1038, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (clearly 
religious) . 
50 These judgments are frequently based on the court's evaluation of the public's perception 
of the opposed action. Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis 58 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 364, 382 (1983). But see Note, Student First Amendment Rights in the Public School Setting: 
A Topic of Increased Litigation, 6 A.J. T.A. 176 (1982). Consideration of the appearance of the 
proposed state action is not a new concept. In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked that consid-
erations of the community are "the very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and 
always with an apology." O. HOLMES, jR., THE COMMON LAw, 35 (Boston 1881). In Wallace, 105 S. 
Ct. at 2492, justice Stewart also appears to be concerned with the public's perception of the statute. 
He looked at the statute to determine whether it conveyed a message of state endorsement of 
religion. 
Recently, several lower courts have articulated this concern. A district court in New Mexico 
openly stressed the importance that public perception plays in its decision. The Court indicated 
that "if the public perceives the state to have approved a daily devotional exercise, the effect of the 
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the true basis of their decisions. For example, the Court held statutes prohibiting the 
teaching of evolution5l and requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in the 
classroom52 unconstitutional because they have religious purposes. Yet, the Court found 
sufficient secular purposes to uphold statutes for religious tax exemptions,53 display of 
a town nativity scene,54 or making the National Mall available for a mass by Pope John 
Paul Ip5 
Notwithstanding the unclear signals from the Supreme Court and the difficulty in 
determining the actual motive of the legislators, the secular purpose prong is still an 
integral part of the predominantly used Lemon test. The religious statutory language, 
the religious statements in the legislative history, the historical context and the absence 
of a plausible secular purpose might render the religious immigrant exception uncon-
stitutional. 
2. The Effect Element 
The second element of the Lemon test requires that the statute in question have a 
"principle or primary effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits religion."56 In the 
majority of the Establishment Clause cases, the challenged enactment results in some 
benefit to religion. Thus, the actual question is whether the principle or primary effect 
of the statute is to confer a benefit on religion. The only apparent effect of the religious 
immigrant exception would be to confer special benefits upon certain religious immi-
grants. In analyzing the effects elements the Court commonly weighs the beneficial 
secular effects found in prior similar cases against the beneficial effects on religion 
resulting from the questioned statute. 57 It is difficult to perceive that permitting thou-
sands of ministers5S to enter the United States could have any effect other than advancing 
religion. 
However, the effects prong of the Lemon test is subject to vehement criticism. Many 
scholars agree that the effects test is incapable of consistent application. 59 Furthermore, 
requiring all legislative enactments to have a primary effect which does not advance 
religion would invalidate numerous practices that have long been accepted as constitu-
tional.60 Statutes providing for religious tax exemptions, Sunday closing laws, and those 
prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverages or establishing adult theaters near 
states action is the advancement of religion." Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 
(D.C.N.M. 1983). 
Essentially, when a statute is more likely to be perceived by the public as supportive of religion, 
courts are more apt to attribute a religious purpose to it. 
5l Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968). 
52 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980). 
53 See supra note 19. 
5. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1983). 
55 O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1980). 
56 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602. 
57 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (1984). 
58 Bulletin of U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs No-83 v. 5. 
59 See, e.g., Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause, 81 COL. L. REV. 1463, 1489 (1981). 
60 Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Separation or Benign 
Neutrality, 16 ST. MARYS L. J. 1 (1984). 
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churches, clearly have a primary effect which benefits religion.61 These statutes, however, 
consistently survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
In addition, consider the benefit conferred upon religious institutions by enactments 
providing them with police, fire and health protection. These statutes, however, survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny because they have both secular and religious effects. These 
statutes have a secular effect in that they protect the community at large while incidentally 
protecting Churches or religious beliefs. In contrast, the only effect of the religious 
immigrant exception is to facilitate the entrance of religious immigrants. 
3. The Entanglement Prong 
The third element of the tripartite Lemon test is the restriction against excessive 
entanglement between religion and government. Essentially, a statute fails this test and 
is unconstitutional if it "foster[s] excessive government entanglement with religion."62 
This element is intended to avoid situations where there is a risk that a regulation will 
inhibit or promote religious views.63 The Court is particularly sensitive when the gov-
ernment becomes entangled in (1) classification of what is or is not an appropriate 
religion, form of religious worship or doctrine, or (2) when the government is forced 
into a continuous relationship involving surveillance or involvement for an unlimited 
period of time. 64 The religious immigrant exception augments government entanglement 
in both of these areas. 
The Federal Immigration Statute requires that special religious immigrants be "min-
ister[s] of a religious denomination [whose services are] ... needed by [a] ... religious 
denomination having a bona fide organization in the United States."65 The statute, 
however, does not further define the phrase "minister of a religious denomination." An 
applicant attempting to fit within this exception applies directly to the U.S. Consulate. 
The appropriate Consulate official must then decide whether the individual is indeed a 
minister of a religious denomination. This naturally involves an evaluation of specific 
beliefs and practices of the individual by a government official which may be held as 
excessive government entanglement. 
In 1982, the Supreme Court affirmed a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 
Rusk v. Espinosa66 and condemned an ordinance that created a similar entanglement 
situation. The questioned ordinance prohibited solicitation of donations without a permit 
but an exemption was provided for certain religious solicitations. The Court of Appeals 
found the enactment unconstitutional because a city official would be involved in the 
"continuing necessity for making judgments as to what is or is not religious."67 Like the 
officials in Rusk, immigration officials under the religious immigrant exception must 
make objective determinations of the appropriateness and legitimacy of certain religious 
groupS.68 It is likely that this continual religious evaluation process would be viewed as 
61Id. 
62 See supra note 56, at 612-13. 
63 See infra note 71. 
64 Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 384 (1984). 
65 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(i). 
66456 U.S. 951 (1982), afl'd 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980). 
67Id. at 481-82. 
68 See supra note 58. 
1987] RELIGIOUS IMMIGRANT 105 
creating excessive governmental entanglement.69 In addition, such required religious 
evaluations may result in excessive litigation.7o Litigation itself is a form of entanglement 
and may influence the court to more readily find the excessive entanglement necessary 
to prove the special immigrant exception in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Like the first two elements of the Lemon test, the entanglement element has also 
been criticized. Critics argue that the Court gives no guidance on how much government 
involvement rises to a level of entanglement. 71 Contemporary society is permeated with 
enactments which result in excessive entanglement between government and religion, 
yet they are rarely found unconstitutional.72 Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the 
entanglement prong often creates an "insoluble paradox."73 For example, the Court 
requires aid to parochial schools to be closely monitored, to avoid sectarian use, yet this 
same close supervision may result in entanglement.74 This reasoning could be applied 
to the special immigrant exception. 
An analysis using the three elements of the Lemon test indicates that the special 
immigrant exception would be held unconstitutional under its application. 
C. Other Constitutional Tests Applied by the Court 
Although the Court predominantly applies the three-part Lemon test, occasionally 
the Court uses other constitutional tests. 75 Rather than use the Lemon t~t, the Court has 
either applied "strict scrutiny" or a historical approach to determine the constitutionality 
of an enactment.76 The religious immigrant exception would probably fail the strict 
scrutiny test. It might, however, be found constitutional through historical anaylsis. 
Under strict scrutiny, the Court would examine a law to determine if it is facially 
religious. If it were facially religious, the law would be subject to strict scrutiny and 
would violate the Establishment Clause unless a compelling government need existed.77 
Thus, a court examining the language of the religious immigrant exception, would find 
it facially religious. This alone would not render it unconstitutional. The statute could 
be redeemed if a compelling governmental need were involved. It is difficult to conceive 
of any compelling governmental need to permit ministers to enter the United Sl4tes 
without numerical restriction. Even if there were a religious labor shortage, these reli-
69 Note, Government Non-Involvement with Religious Institutions, 59 TEX. L. REV. 921, 939 (1981). 
See also supra note 64, at 936. 
70 See, e.g., Matter of M, 1 I. & N. Dec, 147 (BIA-1941); Matter of B, 3 I. & N. Dec. 162 (CO-
1948); Matter of N, 5 I. & N. Dec. 173 (CO)-1953); Matter of Z, 5 I. & N. Dec. 700 (CO-1954); 
Matter of Sinha, 10 I. & N. Dec. 758 (RC-1964); Matter of Rhee, 16 I. & N. Dec. 607 (BIA-1978); 
Matter of Varughese, I.D. 2797 (BIA-1980). However, in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698, the Court stated 
that "[aJ litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, ... create the appearance of 
divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement." 
71 See generally, Ripple, The Entanglment Test of The Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of The 
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978-1979). 
72 See supra note 60 and accompanying discussion. 
73 Wallace, 105 S.Ct. at 2508 (1985) (Rehnquist, j., dissenting). 
74Id. 
75 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (historical analysis); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228 (1983) (strict scrutiny). 
76Id. 
77 Larson, 456 U,S. at 228 (1983). 
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gious workers would be exempt from the numerical restrictions through an alternative 
provision in the Federal Immigration Act.78 
Using a historical analysis, the Court will uphold a statute or practice based on an 
evaluation of the length of time the challenged statute or practice has been accepted.79 
For example, statutes providing for prayer in legislative chambers and religious tax 
exemptions have been upheld because "an unbroken practice ... is not something to be 
lightly cast aside."80 Few practices can claim more continuous application or usage than 
that of providing special status to religious immigrants. The religious immigrant excep-
tion had its origins in the immigration laws of 1921.81 Comparing the religious immigrant 
exception to other practices which the Court has held unconstitutional, the historical 
approach test indicates that the exception would not violate the Establishment Clause. 
D. Federal Power and Limited Judicial Review 
In analyzing the religious immigrant exception under these tests, the SiIpreme Court 
would have to consider that the enactment of the statute was an exercise of federal 
power.82 Although the Court obviously has the power to declare acts of the government 
unconstitutional,83 it might be more lenient in its review of federal legislation. The Court 
will review congressional acts only to determine if they reasonably relate to a constitu-
tional grant of power.84 The first immigration statute enacted by the federal government 
was upheld as a regulation of foreign commerce.85 Since then, the Court has had no 
difficulty in finding sufficient constitutional authority to permit congressional regulation 
of the flow of immigrants.86 Some scholars argue that "if the Constitution cannot prevent 
Congress from excluding whomever it may choose, it cannot prevent Congress from 
admitting whomever it may choose to admit either."87 However, a constitutional challenge 
to the special immigrant exception under the Establishment Clause would not be a 
challenge to congressional power to regulate immigration. 
III. THE INACCURATE FOUNDATION OF CONTEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS 
The religious immigrant exception is likely to fail most constitutional tests currently 
applied by the Court. These tests, however, have been criticized by both jurists and 
scholars.8s What is needed is a more consistent, and better reasoned method of consti-
tutional analysis than that provided by the Lemon test. If the Court had greater fidelity 
78 See DEUTSCH, supra note 1, at 118; See supra note 33 and accompanying discussion. 
79 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678. 
80 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (quoting Wah, 397 U.S. at 678 (1970)). 
81 GORDON & ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE lA (1985). See generally Hoskins, 
The Original Separation of Church and State in America, 2 J. L. & REL. 221 (1984). 
82 NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch.3, part 2, (2d ed. 1983). 
83Id. 
84Id. 
85 The Head Money Cases, 12 U.S. 580 (1884). 
86 The power to regulate immigration has been implied from the power to regulate foreign 
commerce, to declare war, to make treaties, to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, to prohibit 
the importation of persons, and to make all necessary and proper laws. See GORDON & ROSENFELD, 
supra note 81, at 1-3, 1.5. 
87 See supra note 5. 
88 See Smith, supra note 14. See also Note, The Supreme Court and Religion: Historical Overview and 
Future Prognosis, 24 ST. LoUIS U. L. REV. 183 (1980). 
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to the history surrounding the framing and adoption of the Establishment Clause, its 
analysis would be more consistent.B9 Furthermore, the religious immigrant exception 
would not be found unconstitutional if the historical underpinnings of the first amend-
ment were given more consideration. 
The founding fathers were undoubtedly concerned with protecting religious free-
dom.90 They did not, however, adhere to a theory of rigid separation. The Supreme 
Court, by adopting a strict separationist approach in its early decisions, has built its 
Establishment Clause doctrine upon a "mistaken understanding of constitutional his-
tory."9! The founding fathers intended the Establishment Clause only to prohibit the 
federal government from establishing a national religion and to prevent the federal 
government from favoring one religious sect over another.92 The familiar "wall of 
separation" metaphor that was borrowed by the Court from Thomas Jefferson in Everson 
is misleading.93 Neither Jefferson, nor the majority of the framers favored complete 
separation. They saw church and state in a kind of "parallelism, with neither subordinate 
to the other."" The historical record is replete with evidence that Madison, Jefferson 
and the rest of the framers intended only to prohibit the establishment of a national, 
oppressive church.95 They were not seeking to prevent any aid or support of religion in 
general. 
Thus, Jefferson's wall of separation metaphor was wrongly adopted by the Supreme 
Court. In Everson, the Court held that the government was precluded from directly 
assisting or interfering with any or all religion.96 The Court felt that any enactment 
which promoted religion over non-religion would violate the Establishment ClauseY 
The Supreme Court, by failing to consider Jefferson's statement in context, lost sight of 
the framer's goals. If the Court considers the religious immigrant exception in light of 
89 Whether the Court should or should not recognize the Framers' intent and quide its decisions 
accordingly, is a topic which itself would require a separate paper. This analysis proceeds on the 
assumption that the framers' intent should be considered. For additional discussion of this issue, 
see Maltz, Some New Thoughts On An Old Problem-The Role Of the Intent Of The Framers In Constitutional 
Theory, 63 B.V.L. REv. 811, 812 (1983). 
90 Most scholars agree that in the original thirteen colonies there was religious freedom and 
diversity. See e.g., A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE VNITED STATES 7-9, 11-17 
(1964). But see HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: 1795-1965, 
389 (1981). 
9! Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
92Id. at 2509. See generally Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religious Guarantees, 80 YALE 
L.]. 77, 85 (1970). The Supreme Court itself has on occassion hinted that they percieve the framers' 
intent as being to "foreclose the establishment of a state religion familiar in other 18th century 
systems." Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 V.S. 116, 122 (1982) . 
.. Everson, 330 V.S. 1 (1947). Metaphors in general are dangerous. See Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 
2509. 
94 DERR, THE FIRST AMENDMENT As A GUIDE TO CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: THEOLOGICAL 
ILLUSIONS, CULTURAL FANTASIES, AND LEGAL PRACTICALITIES, CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS (J. 
Hensel ed. 1981). See Smith, supra note 14, at 606. Madison's initial proposal of the Bill of Rights 
included a provision indicating that one of its purposes was to prevent a nationally oppressive 
religion. See also Hersman, Lynch v. Donnelly: Has the Lemon Test Soured? 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 133, 
137 (1985). 
95 Hersman, supra note 94, at 136. See also Smith supra, note 14, at 591, 606. 
96 See Everson, 330 V.S. at 1. 
97 Besides being contrary to the framers' intent, this also fails to consider the balancing effect 
of the Free Exercise clause. See Smith, supra note 14, at 642, 643. See also Anastaplo, The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 11 MEM. ST. L. REV. 151 (1981). 
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the original intent of the framers, it would be held constitutional. The exception does 
not promote any single religion nor does it aid in the process of establishing a national 
religion. Rather, by providing easier access to tninisters of many religious organizations, 
the exception favors religious diversity and freedom. 
America has grown strong because of its religious diversity and freedom of religious 
belief. These attributes are supported by America's favorable policy toward religious 
immigrants and "this great source of our strength, should not be choked off by holding 
the special immigrant exception unconstitutional."98 The Court should evaluate the 
special immigrant exception under the Establishment Clause by considering its purpose 
as dictated by the framers of the Constitution: to protect religious freedom. 
98 See supra note 45. 
